Dmitriy Vorobyev, PRIGO University, Czech Republic

"Control over Biased Media"

Abstract

We develop a model which provides a rationale for why powerful incumbents may want to allow for opposition media which are biased against them even in the absence of any cost associated with shutting the media down. In our model, voters are uncertain about relative competence of incumbent and opposition candidates and may subscribe to media to get additional information on it. There are two media outlets, each receiving two independent signals about the competence and transferring one of the signals to subscribers. One media is biased in favor of the incumbent and is likely to select the signal which favors incumbent the most, while another is biased against incumbent and is likely to select the signal which favors incumbent the least. Incumbent is free to shut down any media at no cost. We characterize the conditions under which tolerating opposition media maximizes incumbent's expected share of votes.

Contact person: Andrei Matveenko